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ABSTRACT
There is discussion in both Canada and the UnitedStates of the
government'srequiring private pension plans to provide contractualcost
of—living protection. This paper employs both an auction and an implicit
contract model to identify the compensating wage differentials required
of possible indexing initiatives. The contract model, motivated by the
prevalence (especially in Canada) of ad hoc cost—of—living adjustments
to pensions in pay, presumes that workers have a call option on the invest-
ment earnings in excess of the interest rate assumption used to value the
plan. The case for policy action would appear to rest on either (1) the
assumption that workers misperceive the value (and, possibly, the security)
of pension benefits or (2) the presumption that society should subsidize
pension income by providing to pension plans an investment vehicle (such
as an index bond) whose risk—return characteristics cannot be duplicated
by portfolios of existing assets.
James E. Pesando
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In both Canada and the United States, the benefits provided by
occupational pension plans in the private sector typically contain no
contractual cost—of--living protection. To many advocates of reform,
this is the foremost limitation of such plans. As is well known (Bodie
(1976), Pesando and Rea (1977), Feldstein (1980)), the real return to
traditional plan assets —fixed—incomesecurities and common stocks —
isadversely affected by unanticipated inflation. Thus the absence of
contractual indexing is typically ascribed to the "open—ended commitment"
faced by plan sponsors In the absence of an index bond or an equivalent
Investment vehicle. Those who consider the possibility of requiring
private plans to index pension benefits frequently cite the need for a
parallel government initiative, such as selling price—indexed annuities
to sponsors of eligible pension plans (Economic Council (1979)) or issuing
index bonds (President's Commission (1980))) Alternatively (Task Force
(1979)), the government could mandate performance Indexing, in which
inflation—augmented or "excess" investment earnings above a statutory
real rate would be applied to escalating the value of pensions in force.
Those who advocate a refrom initiative are concerned with the
fact that members of private pension plans are exposed to a great deal
of inflation risk. This exposure stems from the fact that accrued pen-
sion benefits have the investment characteristics of a long—term bond.
Significantly, advocates of reform fail to consider the possibility that
workers may prefer not to have fully indexed pension benefits. Bodie (1980)
demonstrates that the expected return on the portfolio whose real return2
has minimum variance —treasurybills hedged against unanticipated infla-
tion by a small (long) position in a diversified portfolio of commodity
futures —isapproximately zero. If this portfolio adequately approxi-
mates an asset with a risk—free real rate of return, and if workers have
full information, then the explanation for the absence of contractual
indexing must be restated. poyees are not sufficiently risk averse
that they are willing to earn a zero real return on foregone wages in
order to obtain fully and contractually indexed pension benefits. Alter-
natively, employees may hold portfolios (inclusive of pension wealth) in
which they have diversified away the inflation risk associated with the
accrued value of their pension benefits.
Leaving aside (for the moment) the question of whether a reform
initiative can be justified, this paper seeks to identify the compensating
wage differentials required if alternative indexing initiatives were man-
dated by the government. This issue, in turn, draws attention to the ques-
tion of how members of defined benefit plans2 value their pension benefits
in the context of current versus deferred wage tradeoffs. The primary
purpose of the paper is to illustrate that the wage offsets likely to
accompany an indexing initiative are potentially quite large, may be
difficult to predict, and may vary substantially across firms. In so doing,
the paper highlights the information required of workers if they are to
assess correctly the accruing value of their pension benefits. The rationale
for proposed indexing initiatives, although not necessarily so stated,
would appear to depend heavily on the presumption that workers have incom-
plete information.3
To some, the choice of an appropriate model to value pension bene-
fits may seem apparent. If the pension is not indexed, but is payable
with certainty, then the accruing value of the contractual benefit is
determined using the risk—free nominal rate of interest. The prevalence
of ad hoc cost of living adjustments to pensions in pay in both Canada
and the United States suggests, however, that this procedure may under-
state the value to workers of their accruing pension benefits. The
paper thus uses two models to assess the impact of possible indexing initia-
tives. In the auction model, employees receive compensation equal to the
value of their marginal product in each period and only benefits legally
due under the terms of the plan are factored into employee valuation of their
accruing benefits. In the contract model, workers have a call option on
the investment earnings in the pension plan above the assumed valuation
rate. In spite of the defined benefit formula, workers thus have an equity
interest in the pension plan's assets. This model is motivated by the
evidence (especially in Canada) that many firms use "excess" investment
earnings to finance cost—of—living adjustments to pensions in pay. Because
pension benefits in this contract model are —ineffect —partiallyindexed,
the wage offsets required of possible reform initiatives are less than
those implied by the auction model.
The paper is organized as follows. First, the auction model is
reviewed and its salient features noted. Since indexing initiatives might
enhance the security as well as the contractual value of pension benefits,
explicit treatment is .accorded the options inherent in defined benefit
plans. Second, evidence regarding ad hoc cost—of—living adjustments in
Canada and the United States is briefly reviewed in order to motivate4
the contract model. The contract model is next presented, and its econo-
mic rationale and empirical validity are briefly discussed. The impact
of possible indexing initiatives is then analyzed, with the auction and
contract models identifying the probable upper and lower bounds to the
offsets required elsewhere in the compensation package. Throughout the
analysis, features of Canada's occupational pension plans provide the
main institutional background, although most of the analysis is directly
applicable to plans in the United States as well.
2. THE AUCTION MODEL
In a spot auction market, the employee's valuation of his accruing
pension benefits is quite straightforward. He receives in each period
total compensation equal to the value of his marginal product and must
value only the benefits due under the terms of the plan. The
valuation is complicated solely by the need to consider the put options
implicit in the existence of defined benefit plans.
In Canada, as in the United States prior to the passage of ERISA
in 1974, there is no plan termination insurance.3 Further, most employer—
sponsored plans contain explicit provisions which permit the sponsor to
terminate the plan with the employer's obligation equal to the lesser of
vested benefits or the assets in the plan. Treynor (1977) argues that
the implicit liability of the firm, so long as it is an on—going concern,
is to honour all vested pension claims. Sharpe (1976), by contrast,
analyzes the question of optimal funding policy on the explicit assumption
that employers stand prepared to terminate a plan if it is in their interest5
to do so. As noted by Bulow (1979), the absence of plan terminations is
not sufficient to refute this view of employer behaviour since the threat
of plan termination can presumably be used to extract appropriate wage
concessions. On the other hand, the widespread absence of plan termina-
tions may reduce and ultimately eliminate the credibility of such a threat.
Both views as to employer willingness to terminate unilaterally an occupa-
tion pension plan are incorporated into the subsequent analysis.
Assume that economic agents are rational and have access to the
same capital market, that the relevant option contracts are available in
the capital market (or would be so if agents desired), and that there are
no taxes.4 Assume first that employers will terminate their plans if it
is in their interest to do so. Following Sharpe (1976), the firm promises
at the beginning of each period to pay its employees a nominal pension
claim L1, known at present with certainty, at the end of the period.
The firm establishes a pension fund (A) to help meet this obligation,
which will have a (presently uncertain) value A1 =(l+)A0,where
is the (uncertain) return on the plan's assets. At the end of the year,
the pension liabilities will be discharged in full if A1 >L1,with
any excess (A1 —L1)reverting to the firm. If A1 <L1,then employees
receive only A1 and the firm is not liable for the difference. In effect,
the firm has a call option on the assets with a striking price L1. Employees,
in turn, hold a contract to receive the certain pension payment L1, and
have sold a put option on the assets in the fund with a striking price L1.
Let w denote the current wage paid in period t, let VMPt denote the
value of the worker's marginal product, and —forsimplicity —assumethat
a(r) is the measure of risk pertinent to the pricing of the relevant options.6
Then, under the auction model, the following obtains.




The compensation package consists of three components: the current wage
plus the contractual value of the pension claim, less the value of the
"pension put". The latter component recognizes, in effect, that the pen-
sion benefit actually paid may fall short of its contractual value. The
lower the degree of funding (A) and the higher the degree of risk (a(i))
of the plan's assets, given L1, the greater will be the value of the put
option and cet. thehigher must be w if (1) is toobtain.5 If the
plan's funds are invested solely in the risk—free asset and thus earn the
risk—free rate (rf) and if the plan is fully funded when valued at the
risk—free rate (i.e. A(l + rf) =L1),
then the value of the put option
is zero. In general, this will not be the case.
If, as argued by Treynor (1977), the implicit obligation of an on-
going firm is to honour all (vested) pension benefits, then the optioned
assets expand to include the equity (E) in the firm. So long as
+ A .?L1,
then the pension liability will be discharged in full.
Let denote the return on the firm assets inclusive of the funds in the
pension plan and let a() denote the measure of risk relevant to option
pricing. Then (1) becomes:
w' + PV(L1) —PV(PUT(A+ E, L1, a(fl) =VMPt
Since E >0,the value of the put option cet. is less in (1)'
than in (1) and thus w >w.Further, in (1)' unlike (1), the employee7
must factor the likelihood of firm insolvency into the valuation of the
pension put and thus into the valuation of his pension claim.
Finally, if the pension benefit L1 is fully insured, either by
a private insurance company or through public termination insurance such





If benefits are fully insured, then the informational
requirements imposed on the employee falls since he no longer has to value
the pension put in assessing the value of his accruing pension benefit.
This auction model has two important implications. First, the
reported interest rate assumptions used in formal plan valuations are just
a "shell" and convey no information regarding employee valuation of accru-
ing pension benefits.6 If the pension benefit is nominal (i.e. non—indexed),
then rational employees use the risk—free nominal rate —notthe reported
valuationassumption —tocalculate the present value of the contractual
benefit L1. If this nominal rate includes an inflation premium, then
employees value this contractual benefit on the implicit assumption that
it will be eroded by the inflation —inthis simple model —expectedto
occur during its accrual period. If the contractual benefit L1 is viewed
as the lump sum necessary to purchase a requisite annuity, then its valua-
tion will be premised as well on the erosion of the real value of the pen-
sion in force.
Second, under (1), the decision by the employer to underfund the plan
will raise the value of the pension put. Since the interest rate assumption
represents a means by which the employer can either accelerate or retard8
the degree of funding, given the benefit formula, this is the only avenue
through which the reported interest rate assumption can influence employee
valuation of accruing pension benefits. Under (1)', there can be no pre-
sumption that additional payments to the pension fund will enhance the
security of the benefit and thus reduce the value of the pension put. If
the firm had unencumbered access to assets in the plan, then additional
debt—financed contributions which were used to acquire additional bonds
for the pension fund would leave the value of the pension put unchanged.7
If these same contributions were used to acquire additional stocks in the
pension fund, the riskiness of the firm would increase and the value of
the pension put would rise. For purposes of the subsequent analysis,
it will be assumed that altering the level of contributions under (1)
will leave the value of the pension put unchanged.
3. "AD HOC" COST—OF—LIVING ADJUSTMENTS: LIMITATIONS OF THE AUCTION MODEL
There are a number of concerns regarding the validity of the auction
model described above. With the possible exception of tax considerations,8
there is no reason why a firm would choose to provide a pension plan. In
addition, discontinuities associated with (1) cliff vesting rules and
(2) early retirement options render suspect the prediction that in every
priod the current wage will adjust to offset fully any change in the accru-
ing value of the pensionbenefit.9 Of particular relevance to this paper,
however, is the tendency for large employers in the non—union sector to
make cost—of—living adjustments to pensions in pay.
There are no official data compiled by the Government of Canada on
either the magnitude of frequency of these adjustments. Two private surveys,9
however, provide evidence on this issue. The Report by Tomenson—Alexander
(1978) notes that 117 of the 149 large (active membership of at least 500)
plans surveyed provided some form of cost—of—living adjustments to pensions
in pay during the period 1971—1975. For the majority (101 respondents),
the adjustments were not required under the terms of the plan and thus
were entirely ad hoc. For those plans reporting adjustments, the payments
averaged two—thirds of the amount necessary to offset fully the impact of
inflation as measured by the consumer price index. The most recent Report
on Survey of Pension Plans in Canada (March, 1980) by the Financial Execu-
tives Institute Canada (FEIC) indicated that 75% of the respondents had
taken some action to offset the impact of inflation. Again, in the great
majority of cases, this action was taken unilaterally by the plan sponsor.
In the United States, data compiled by the Bankers Trust Company (1980)
indicate that approximately 70% of large employers made cost—of—living
adjustments during the period December 1974 to December 1979, typically
on an ad hoc basis. These increases appear to have been somewhat less
generous than those made in Canada, averaging about 25% to 30% of the
amount required to fully offset the impact of inflation. The key point,
of course, is that since employees can never be paid less than the value
of their marginal product in the auction model, ad hoc cost—of—living
payments represent gratuitous transfers of wealth from employers/shareholders
to retired employees.
Of equal importance, there is evidence that a significant proportion
of these payments is being financed out of "excess" investment earnings,
or investment earnings in excess of the assumed valuation rate. The FEIC
reports that 59.9% (by plan respondent) of the cost increases were funded10
out of plan assets, while 31.8% were "expensed as paid". It would appear
that "expensed as paid" refers to payments out of general corporate
revenues, although this is not clear from the questionnaire. In the
Tomenson—Alexander survey, the ad hoc adjustments were financed —in
whole or in part —throughgeneral corporate revenues for only 32 of the
117 firms which made these adjustments. The majority of firms thus financed
thead hoc payments by creating new unfunded liabilities which were dis-
charged through a combination of plan surpluses and special payments. At
least in Canada, the likelihood that many firms are using "excess" invest-
ment earnings to finance ad hoc cost—of—living adjustments and/or nominal
benefit enrichments (career average plans) is widely acknowledged within
the private pension industry.
4. THE IMPLICIT CONTRACT MODEL
The essence of the contract model suggested by the stylized facts
noted previously can be illustrated using the one—period model introduced
earlier. Again, let L1 represent the nominal value of a pension claim
due at the end of the period. Then PV(L1), calculated at the risk—
free nominal rate rf identifies the contribution Af necessary to
fully fund the plan. If the plan sponsor values the plan on the basis
of an interest rate assumption r <rf.then the required contribution
A(where A(l+r) =L1)will exceed Af. Assume (for simplicity)
that the funds are invested at the risk—free rate. Then the plan will
experience an actuarial surplus equal to (A —Af)(l+ rf). Under the
auction model, this surplus would revert to the employer. Under the con—
tract model, this surplus would be returned to the employee, in this case11
inthe form of an ad hoc enrichment to the nominal benefit L1.
Since these adjustments are (1) the result of an implicit contract
and(2) paid later than the period when they are earned, it is logical to
assume that the large firmswhomake these payments also behave according
to(1)'. For simplicity, it will be assumed that these large firms have
no probability of going bankrupt and hence that the value of the pension
put is equal to zero. In general, the return to the plan's assets will
be uncertain. The contract model requires that if < rv, the employee
receives the contractual benefit L1. If > r, then the employee
receives the augmented benefit L =A(i+i )>L .Sincethe contractual
1 V 1 1
benefit is nominal, the risk—free nominal rate rf is still used to cal-
culate its present value. Thus the employee's compensation is:
w" + PV(L1) + PV(CALL(A ,A(l+r),a())) =
VMPt
(2)
The employee has a call option on the investment earnings in excess of
those implied by the valuation rate. If the employee retires at the end
of the period, he receives an "ad hoc" increase in his pension. If he
is still an active worker at the end of the period, he receives either an
amendment to the benefit formula or an appropriate increase in his next
period's wage. Note that the degree of risk in the pension fund —and
thus the value of the call option —isan integral part of the implicit
contract.Note also that w (in (1)") >w"
The rationale for firms and workers entering into this type of
implicit contract maybetied to a risk—sharing arrangement. Employees
maybeconcerned with the preservation of the real value of their pension12
benefits. They may be unwilling, however, to assume the full cost —avery
low and perhaps zero real return on foregone wages —offull and contractual
indexing. Instead, employers (because <rdoes not lower the con-
tractual benefit L1) and employees share the investment risk associated
with the plan's assets. To the extent that workers who terminate prior
to retirement are not granted ad hoc adjustments when their deferred pen-
sions become payable,1° this contract may also serve as a turnover penalty
in situations where workers have firm—specific human capitaL The fact that
these contracts are not written explicitly into the pension plan may be
of significance in this regard, since the firm is thus not bound by statutory
vesting provisions.
As noted, there is informal evidence which suggests that this con-
tract model may have widespread validity, especially in Canada. More
formally, the model predicts that cet. thoseplans which use a lower
valuation rate will grant more generous cost—of—living adjustments to pen-
sions in pay. In principle, this prediction is testable, although the
requisite data are not readily available. The FEIC data that are available
doprovide evidence that actuarial experience and ad hoc adjustments are
linked. For thosefinal earnings11 plans in which actuarial deficits
(called"experience deficiencies") were large, or between 5.0%and 75%
ofaccrued liabilities, noannual or biannual payments were made. For
firms in which experience deficiencies were small, or less than 2.5% of
accruedliabilities, a full 50% had made annual cost—of—living adjustments
during the past few years. If —asseems probable —thefrequency of the
ad hoc payments is a good proxy for their generosity, the results are
consistent with the prediction of the contract model.13
5. THE IMPACT OF INDEXING INITIATIVES
If the government were to legislate an indexing requirement, it
could take at least three forms: (a) full and contractual indexing
without the simultaneous introduction of an index bond or its equivalent
by the government; (b) full and contractual indexing with the introduc-
tion of such an instrument; and (c) performance indexing, in which "excess"
investment earnings above a statutory real interest rate are used to
make cost—of—living adjustments to pensions in pay.'2 If workers have
full information, then option (a) is clearly inefficient since workers
subject to today's market opportunities have not opted for fully indexed
benefits. Option (b) might be efficient, but only if the new instrument
provided by the government (e.g. an index bond offering a real return of
3%) possessed risk—return characteristics that could not be reproduced
with existing assets. Option (c), with the statutory real rate replacing
the valuation rate, is effectively the implicit contract model sketched
earlier in the paper.
Consider first the impact of (a) or (b). Assuming that the minimum—
variance portfolio now available is an adequate approximation to an asset
with a risk—free real rate of return, they differ only in that the risk—
free real interest rate (if) is presumably higher in (b) than in (a).
In the auction model, i replaces rf in calculating PV(Li) in
(1)—(l)'', thus cet. 2• raising the value of accruing pension benefit
and requiring either a reduction inw and/or L1.13 To the extent that
sponsors of career average and flat benefit plans are forced in effect to
pre—fund the retroactive, nominal benefit improvements that typically occur,
the funded status of these plans will improve)4 Under (1), the value of14
the put option will fall, thus cet. 2• re—inforcing the effects noted
above. Under (1)', the value of the put option does not necessarily fall,
at least in the case in which the firm finances its additional pension
contributions by issuing additional debt. Under (1)", the fully insured
case, the value of the put option is zero and any change in the rapidity
of funding occasioned by the indexing initiative will exert no impact on
the employment contract. In the contract model, options (a) and (b)
require that i replace rf in calculating PV(Li) in (2). The call
option in (2) no longer exists now that pension benefits are fully indexed.
So long as workers —aspart of the implicit contract —neverreceive
more than full cost—of—living protection, then the increase in the value
of PV CL )mustexceed the value of the call option if r > i .Since
t 1 v f
this is likely to be the case, both (a) and (b) effectively require a reduc-
tion in wand/or L1. Consistent with the earlier analysis, the value
of the pension put is assumed equal to zero and thus any impact on the
funded status of plans requires no compensating wage differential.
Let i now designate the statutory real interest rate in the per-
formance indexing initiative. For the auction model, rf continues to be
used to determine PV(Li), but workers now have a call option on invest-
ment earnings in excess of Thus, again, a reduction in w and/or
must occur. Since i would be the rate which plan sponsors would
be required to use to establish contribution rates, the pre—funding of
nominal, retroactive benefit improvements in career average and flat
benefit plans would also impact on the employment contract via the valua-
tion of the put options as discussed previously. For the contract model,
performance indexing would simply lead to the substitution of i for rv15
in the call option in (2). For i <r,which is typical, the value
of the call option cet. .increasesand thus an offsetting reduction in
w and/or L1 is required.
Thus, the introduction of any of the initiatives —underboth models —
islikely to require a reduction in w or L1 or both. Unless workers
are willing to devote a higher fraction of their lifetime earnings to pen-
sions, a reduction in L1 is inevitable. Policy—makers, in short, must
recognize that the initiatives are likely to force workers to take "low
start, escalating" as distinct from "high start, non—escalating" pensions.
If workers prefer "high start, escalating" pensions because they are liquidity
constrained and/or concerned with the security of less than fully insured
benefits, the initiatives would be welfare reducing. Finally, in both
models, the introduction of a retroactive initiative would arbitrarily
redistribute wealth from shareholders to workers with past service credits
under the terms of the plan. In the auction model, these windfall gains
would exceed the new unfunded liabilities created when plan sponsors
valued accrued benefits at the statutory real rate rather than at their
previous valuation rate. This result reflects the fact that nominal
interest rates typically exceed valuation rates. Under the full informa-
tion assumption, there is no rationale for requiring that any indexing
initiative be made retroactive.
How large will the wage offsets actually be? Assume that the value
of the pension put is equal to zero. Under the auction model, the increase
in the value of the pension benefit when full and contractual indexing is
introduced is easy to calculate. It is simply equal to the present value
of the benefit calculated at i less its present value when calculated16
at rf. Under the contract model, the calculation is complicated by the
presence of the call option in (2). Assume that (i) the plan is fully
invested at (ii) the statutory real rate is i. and (iii) the rate
of inflation is always greater than or equal to r —i•
In this special
case, the increase in the value of the pension benefit is equal to the
present value of the required annuity calculated at i less its value
when calculated at r. This simple result occurs because, in the absence
of the indexing initiative, the real value of the benefit declines with
certainty at a rate equal to r —If Ingeneral, this exact result
will not obtain and the use of the difference between the annuity valued
at i and rto measure its increased value will only be approximate.
Subject to this approximation, however, an important result emerges. As
in the case of a defined contribution plan, the value to the employee of
his accruing pension benefit is measured by the value of the employer's
contribution to the plan.
Consider the simple case of a pension benefit (annuity) that is
payable with certainty for 15 years. Assume that i and rf equal 2%
and 12%, respectively. Assume that r equals 6%, which is in line with
current practice in both Canada (Table 1) and the United States. Under
the auction model, the value (at the date the annuity becomes payable)
of the benefit increases by a full 89% if full and contractual indexing
is introduced. Under the contract model, the value of the benefit rises
by 32%. The smaller increase in value under the contract model is due to
the fact that the benefit is, in effect, partially indexed prior to the
introduction of the government's initiative.17
To provide a more complete assessment of the impact of a possible
indexing initiative, one must consider the stylized features of alternative
plan designs. If post—retirement indexing (only) is introduced, then its
impact will be the same for all plans under the auction model. Under the
contract model, its impact will vary with the plan's valuation assumption.
If pre— and post—retirement indexing is introduced, its impact —evenin
the auction model —willvary with the plan's benefit formula. Assume
that the government mandates full and contractual indexing and issues index
bonds with a real interest rate of 2% (3%). Assume, again, that the value
of the pension put is zero. So long as the risk—free nominal rate exceeds
the (maximum) valuation assumption, the impact of the indexing initiative
will always be greater under the auction model. It is thus instructive,
for the range in interest rate assumptions reported in Table 1, to note
the magnitude of the wage offsets required even under the contract model.
The exercises (Table 2) illustrate the impact of (i) post—retirement
and (ii) pre— and post—retirement indexing on the required contribution
ratesfor a flat benefit, a career average and a final earnings plan. As
noted, the contribution rates established by the choice of the interest
rateassumption approximate the value of accruing pension benefits in the
contract model. Because of the widespread use of projected benefit fund-
ing, contribution rates are calculated using both accrued and projected
benefits methods.16 The benefit in the career average plan is 2% of each
year's earnings; in the final earnings plan, 2% of earnings in the final
year of employment times the number of years of service; in the flat bene-
fit plan, a fixed amount equal to 2% of earnings in the first year of
employment (projected benefit funding) or 2% of the earnings of a representative18
member at age 40 (accrued benefit funding), both times the number of years
of service. Plan members are assumed to remain with certainty in the plan
until age 65 and to draw their pensions for exactly 15 years. The issues
of termination and vesting, as well as the more complex benefit structures
of actual plans, are thus ignored.
For pst—retirement indexing, the contribution rates must be recal-
culated with the annuities payable under the terms of the plans now valued
at the real interest rate of 2% (3%). For pre— and post—retirement indexing,
the recalculation of the contribution is more complicated. Because the
benefit is tied to earnings in the very last year of employment in the final
earnings plan, and since —byconstruction —theinflation factor is the
same in both the interest rate and salary scale assumptions, there is no
change in the contribution rate that is established when only post—retirement
indexing is required)7 In the flat benefit and career average plans, where
inflation does erode the real value of accruing pension benefits, pre—
retirement indexing does require further increases in the contribution rate.
Details of all calculations are reported in Appendix A.
The results, while only suggestive, highlight the magnitude of the
increases in contribution rates —andthus the required wage offsets —
ifan indexing initiative is introduced. If pst—retirement indexing (at
3%) is introduced, the contribution rate (projected benefit funding) rises
from 5.69% of covered earnings to 7.90% for career average plans initially
valued at an interest rate assumption of 7.5% and from 11.14 to 12.09 for
plans valued at an interest rate of 4.2%.18 If both pre— and post—retirement
indexing (at 3%) are introduced, the contribution rate rises to 14.47% of
earnings for both plans. Flat benefit plans are typically renegotiated —19
and the amendments made retroactive —ateach contract renewal. The sharp
increase in contribution rates under pre— and post-retirementindexing
thus illustrate the impact of requiring that plansponsors cost the bene-
fits in real terms on a continuing basis, rather than periodicallyrevising
the benefit formula and thus establishing new unfunded liabilities.
Finally, it is straightforward using the formulae presented in Appendix A
to calculate the reduction in the benefit formula which will hold the
required contribution rate constant. If post—retirement indexing (at 3%)
is introduced, the benefit must be reduced from 2.0% to 1.49%per year
of service in both the final average and careeraverage plans originally
valued at an interest rate of 7.5%.
6. SUARY AND CONCLUSION
Reform advocates have proposed a variety of initiatives to improve
the cost—of—living protection provided by private pension plans. The
most straightforward would require that plans provide benefits that are
fully indexed to the consumer price index, and would be accompanied by
the government's issuing index bonds earmarked for pension plans.
This paper has demonstrated that the wage offsets (which could take
the form of reductions in initial pension benefits) required of thisor
similar initiatives are potentially quite large. These offsetsmay be
difficult to predict in view of the uncertainty which existsconcerning
the appropriate model with which to value accruing pension benefits, and
they may vary sharply across firms. Wage offsets are largest in the auction
model, where the impact of the initiatives is to transfer purely nominal
into real pension benefits. In the contract model,wage offsets are smaller20
because pension benefits are already partially indexed in spite of the
fact that benefits under the formal terms of the plan are purely nominal.
If workers are rational, and thus do not (for example) misperceive nominal
to be real pension benefits, the contract model is likely to provide the
lower bound to the wage offsets required of an indexing initiative.
Further, as emphasized in the text, the introduction of an indexing initia-
tive may—byaccelerating the degree of funding (especially) in flat bene-
fit and career average plans —enhancethe security of contractual benefits
and thus require further wage offsets on this account.
If rational agents enter into voluntary employment contracts, then
externally imposed constraints on the form of these contracts will be
inefficient. This possibility is raised by Pesando and Rea (1977) with
regard to the elimination of deferred vesting, by Lazar (1979) with regard
to a ban on mandatory retirement, and by Arnott and Gersovitz (1980) with
regard to the requirement that all pension benefits be fully funded. In
the present context, contractual indexing accompanied (say) by the issuance
of index bonds by the government may be efficient, but only if the index
bonds possess risk—return characteristics that cannot be duplicated by
portfolios of existing assets. Under the full information assumption, a
policy initiative would appear to require the explicit decision to subsidize
retirement income that flows through private pension plans.
In fact, advocates of reform would appear to implicitly reject the
full information assumption. Many reform advocates (Task Force (1979))
imply that workers, for example, have not appropriately discounted the
eroding impact of anticipated inflation on their nominal pension benefits.
Although this concern may be misplaced if labour markets are truly competitive,1921
the fact that this and related concerns do exist must be acknowledged.
If the full information assumption is indeed suspect, a preferred policy
response might be to ensure, for example, that employers and workers alike
understand that plans must be valued on the basis of a real interest rate if
the contribution rates so determined are to be sufficient —atleast in
principle —toprovide fully indexed benefits.
Finally, the analysis in the text draws attention to two additional
points regarding private pension plans. First, under the auction model,
the use of employer contributions to measure the value of accruing pension
benefits in empirical tests of current versus deferred wage tradeoffs is
generally inappropriate. In view of the substantial variation in reported
valuation assumptions, the contribution rates established for a given
benefit formula may differ sharply. This fact may receive too little
attention from empirical researchers.2° Second, workers in the contract
model have an equity interest in the plan's assets and the distinction
between a defined benefit and a defined contribution plan thus becomes
blurred. The requirement that pension liabilities be independent of pen-
sion fund assets (and hence pension fund performance), which underlies the
augmented balance sheet employed recently by Black (1980) andTepper(1981)
in their analysis of optimal funding and pension asset allocation, is clearly
violated and results so obtained may require modification.22
FOOTNOTES
Analysis of household demand for index bonds (Fischer (1975)), Blinder
(1977), and Siegel and Warner (1977)) has already established that
borrowers could issue index bonds at lower ex ante real interest rates
than those required on traditional bonds. Attention (Fischer (1979) and
Levhari and Leviatan (1977)) has shifted to the conundrum posed by the
nonissuance of index bonds by private borrowers.
2Defined benefit plans are those in which the benefit is defined by a
formula (e.g. 2% of final earnings for each year of service) and contri-
butions are varied so as to provide the indicated benefit. In defined
contribution plans, the pension is determined by the accumulated value
of the contributions made by or on behalf of the employee. For defined
contribution plans, there is no ambiguity in determining the value of
the worker's pension claim. It is simply equal to the employer's contri-
bution to the plan. In Canada, almost 95% of plan members are in defined
benefit plans. Unless otherwise specified, the term "pension plan" in
the text will refer to a defined benefit plan.
In December of 1980, the Province of Ontario introduced a termination
insurance scheme, although neither the federal government nor any other
province has followed Suit.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) established the
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation to provide plan termination insurance
to private sector plans. Pension plans provided by state and local
governments, however, are exempted from the provisions of ERISA.23
Employees in Canada can make tax deductible contributions to their
own defined contribution plans (called Registered Retirement Savings
Plans), and the funds accumulate on a tax free basis. The present
ceiling is $5,500 per year. Employees in the United States can make
contributions to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), which offer
comparable tax advantages, but only to a limit of $1,500 per year.
Assume that either (1) employees can access the tax subsidies accorded
pension plans without requiring that they be a member of an occupational
pension plan or (2) labour is supplied perfectly inelastically in a com-
petitive labour market, in which case competition among firms will
ensure that the tax subsidy associated with pensions will benefit only
workers. Then the use of a before—tax, risk—free nominal interest rate
to value accruing benefits in an occupational plan would be appropriate
on the assumption that the (nominal) benefits are payable with certainty.
In the non—union sector, the existence of a poorly funded plan may not
be stable since terminating workers cannot be forced to assume the
costs of future contributions which enhance the value of all benefits
payable under the terms of the plan. See Bulow (1979).
6
Note that projected as distinct from accrued benefit funding (Barnow—
Ehrenberg (1979)) is also a "shell". The reported interest rate assump-
tion —likethe actuarial method —issimply a means of accelerating
or retarding (tax deductible) payments into the plan.
In the debt capacity model analyzed by Black (1980), the firm maximizes
its access to the tax subsidy associated with issuing debt by fully
funding its plan and holding only bonds in the pension portfolio.24
8If the firmcouldoverfund the planandgain the tax advantages
so offered (Bulow (1981)), then it would have an incentive to provide
a (defined benefit) plan. See also footnote 4.
In Canada, statutory provisions typically require that an employee's
pension benefits vest (i.e., he becomes legally entitled to a pension
payablewder the terms of the plan) after he has reached age 45 and
completed 10 years of service. Although many plans have more liberal
provisions,74.3% of plan members in 1978 were still in plans which had
a vesting requirement of ten or more years of service (Statistics
Canada (1980)). The "45 and 10" rule implies that an unrealistically
large offset in the current wage may be required in the year that the
employee's benefits actually vest. If an employee attains age 45 after
completing 10 years of service in a plan whose benefit is 2% of final
earnings for each year of service, and if it is assumed that the employee
lives with certainty for 15 years after the normal retirement age of 65,
then —atan interest rate of 6% (8%) —thevalue of his accruing benefit
rises from zero in the preceding year to 60% (37%) of his current salary
in this the year in which his benefit vests. If the employee 's produc-
tivity is unchanged, and if the value of the relevant pension put is
sufficiently close to zero that it can be ignored, then a corresponding
reduction in his current wage would be required. In fact, there is no
evidence that discrete wage reductions of this order of magnitude actually
take place. A similar argument applies to the date at which an employee
becomes eligible for an (actuarially unfair) early retirement benefit
under the terms of the plan.25
10If the worker forfeits the ad hoc enrichment if he terminates prior
to retirement, equation (2) must be modified accordingly. In general,
evidence on this issue is hard to obtain, although —inCanada —there
is reason to believe that many terminated (vested) workers do not receive
ad hoc adjustments when their pensions become payable. This is clearly
the case when the firm discharges its obligation by purchasing a deferred
annuity from a life insurance company. The result is less clear when
the firm retains the worker "on the books" and begins to make pension
payments when the terminated worker reaches normal retirement age under
the terms of the plan.
11Final earnings plans are plans in which the benefit is tied to the
employee's earnings at or near the time of his retirement. Detailed
data were compiled by the FEIC only for final earnings plans.
12
For a detailed discussion of performance indexing, together with simula-
tion experiments designed to illustrate its potential effectiveness,
see Task Force (1979).
13
Feldstein (1981) also emphasizes this point.
14
In flat benefit plans, which typify the union sector, members receive a
fixed amount (e.g. $10.00 per month) for each year of service. In career
average plans, members accrue a benefit in each year equal to a fraction
(e.g. 2%) of that year's earnings. For both types of plans, but especially
for flat benefit plans, retroactive amendments are common. In Canada, the
unfunded liabilities created when retroactive amendments are made are
amortized over a 15 year period. In an inflationary climate, the succes-
sion of such amendments —designedin large part to offset the eroding26
impact of inflation on the real value of accrued benefits —virtually
guarantees that such plans will be poorly funded. For a discussion of
the funded status of flat benefit plans in the United States, most of
which is directly applicable to Canada, see Bulow (1979).
15
Note, for example, that if the inflation rate ('rr) is exactly equal to
r — then the certain return on the plan's assets is rf =if+TIrV
and the value of the call option is zero. The real value of the nominal
benefit L1 thus declines (instantaneously) at the rate Ti.
16For a detailed discussion of implicit contracts in the context of pro-
jected benefit funding, see Bulow (1979). In essence, this method is
valid only if there is an implicit contract that the more rapid rate of
benefit accruals which occurs as the worker ages will not be offset by
slower wage growth relative to that which would occur in a defined con-
tribution plan.
17Although an exogenous salary growth assumption is used in these illustra-
tions, it should not be inferred that all inflation risk has been transferred
from the worker to the firminthe final earnings plan. So long as
indexing only applies in the post—retirement period, the worker's accrued
benefit during his active work years remains nominal and thus retains
the investment characteristics of a long—term bond. From this perspec—
tive, the mechanical nature of the exercises discussed in the text merits
emphasis.
18Under the contract model, the different contribution rates are inter-
preted as follows. Assume that the real rate is 3% and that the nominal
rate is 7.5%, so that the expected rate of inflation is 4.5%. Then the27
plan valued at 7.5% is premised on the real erosion of accrued benefits
at 4.5% per year during the pre—retirement period, compared to 4.2 —3.0
=1.2%for the plan valued at 4.2%. The plan valued at the lower rate,
in effect, contains an implicit commitment to escalate the value of
accrued benefits at 3.3% per year, which necessitates the higher con-
tribution rate.
19
If labour is inelastically supplied, then competitive behaviour by
firms will ensure that the current wages paid to workers will discount
this anticipated erosion in the appropriate manner even if workers do
not fully perceive the true situation.
20
Woodbury (1980) uses the value of employer contributions in his tests
of preferences for wage and non—wage benefits without acknowledging the
implicationscited in the text. Smith (1980) ,althoughusing the present
value of accruing benefits in his tests, accepts the values as calculated
bythe actuaries of each individual plan. In view of the acknowledged
variation in interest rate assumptions across plans, his procedure is
essentially equivalent to using employer contributions (exclusive of
amortization payments for unfunded prior service liabilities) to value
accruing pension benefits.28
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INTERFIRNVARIATION IN VALL!ATION AssUrpTIo::s:I:?AcTo:ESTINATED
COSTS OF PFtE—AND POST—RETIRENENT INDEXING
CONTRIBUTION RATE (%COVEREDEARNINGS)
Not
Indexed Inde:e: Real Interest Rate (i)
Post—Retirer2ent Pre— and Post
(cly) Retirement
'rojected Benefit Funding (Entry Age 30) i=2.O i3.O i2.O i=3.0
:areer Average r7.5. g=6.4 5.89 8.48 7.90 18.2414.47
r=4.2, g3.l 11.14 12.97 12.09 18.2414.47
'inal Earningsr7.5, g6.4 14.76 21.23 19.80 21.2 19.80
r=3.0, g=l.9 19.80 21.23 19.80 21.2319.80
'lat Benefit r6.7, g5.6 2.18 2.99 2.78 15.5010.18
r3.5, g=2.4 8.26 9.17 8.55 15.5010.18
ccrued Benefit Funding (Age 40)
areer Averager=7.5 — 2.55 3.67 3.44 15.7211.41
r4.2 — 7.79 9.07 8.46 15.7211.41
'inal Earnings r7.5, g=6.4 13.68 19.69 18.35 19.6918.35
r3.O, g=1..9 18.35 19.69 18.35 19.6918.35
'lat Benefit r=6.7 — 3.54 4.85 4.19 15.72 1.41
r=3.5 — 9.73 10.80 10.07 15.7211.41
otes: 1. Range of interest rate (r) assumptions, by benefit formula, drawn from Report
on Survey of Pension Plans in Canada (Toronto: Financial Executives Institute
Canada, Narch 1980), Appendix J. Salary scale assumptions (g) determined by
subtracting grand mean interest rate/salary scale "spread" of 1.17. from
corresponding interest rates.
2. Benefit in career average plans is 2% of each year's earnings; in final earnings
plans, 2% of earnings in final year of employment; in flat benefit plans, a
fixed amount equal to 2% of earnings in first year of employment (projected
benefit funding) or 2% of earnings of representative member at age 40 (accrued
benefit funding). Plan members remain with certainty in plan until age 65,
and draw pensions for exactly 15 years.
3. Real interest rate of 2%, combined with nominal rate of 7.5%, implies an infla-
tion rate of 5.5%, etc. The constant interest rate/salary scale "spread" of
1.17. implies that real salary gro'th is 0.9% when the real interest rate is
2% and 1.9% when the real interest rate is 3%.APPENDIX A
CALCULATION OF CONTRIBUTION RATES UNDER PROJECTED AND ACCRUED
BENEFIT FUNDING
Projected Benefit Funding








Flat Benefit Plan VR =bRe_dA =bR(l-e_D_)
2. Accumulated value of contributions at member's retirementage (all plans):
c=1Rgs+r(R_s) =— (RrR) R o o\g—r
3. Set VR =
CRand solve for contribution rate (C)
4.Calculation of the impact on the contribution rate of valuing the annuity
payable under the plan at a real interest rate (1) rather than a nominal
interest rate Cr):
Final Earnings Plan VR = e1dA =
etc.5. Calculation of the impact on the contribution rate of full indexing, both
pre— and post—retirement, with real interest rate (1) andinflation rate p
(p=r—i):
Final Earnings Plan: Same as in 4.
R D









Flat Benefit Plan: VR =bRePR Je1dA=bR
R
Accrued Benefit Fundin&
1. Calculation of premium required in period ttopurchase benefit
which accrues in period t





(l— e_r_ __ tc CareerAverage Plan Pt =kWtert)JD
—r(A—R) —r(R—t) 1(1... e dA=kWe
R
D
Flat Benefit Plan Pt
e e dA =be —1—a _________________ b
—r(R—t) I—r(A—R) —r(R—t) —r(D—R)
2. Contribution rate (cr) equals pdivided by W
t t3. Calculation of the impact on the contribution rate of valuing the annuity
payable under the plan at a real interest rate (i) rather than a nominal
interest rate (r):
Final Earnings Plan Pt =kW
g —t)—r(R—t)1D
_i(A_R)dA _________ e le
etc.
=kWtet)(-(l_ e(1_1)
4.Calculation of the impactonthe contribution rate of full indexing, both
pre— and post—retirement, with real interest rate (1)











Flat Benefit Plan: Pt =beit)
J
—i(A—R) —i(R—t) 1
_i(D_R))) __________________ e dA =be
(1(l—e
R
Note: Member receives wage W at time he enters plan, works for R periods,
0
receives pension credit k for each period of service to be applied to
earningsbase under the plan (or a periodic payment b in the case of a
flat benefit plan), anddrawspension for (D—R) periods. Salary grows
atthe nominal rate g and the nominal interest rate is r